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Transboundary Water Governance: Adaptation to Climate Change
Chapter Three
Cooperative Transboundary Mechanisms
Alena Drieschova and Gabriel Eckstein1
3.1 Introduction
Natural freshwater basin boundaries do not usually coincide with man-made borders; more than 
500 international freshwater rivers, lakes, and aquifers traverse the frontiers of as many as 148 
countries. Consequently, most of the uncertainties in the water sector resulting from climate change 
can only be successfully addressed through international cooperation. Such cooperation, though, 
will not be easy. Uncertainties related to climate change pose particular difficulties for international 
cooperation because of the lack of an internationally shared government and a clear enforceability 
structure to guarantee implementation of existing rules. This chapter seeks to identify strategies and 
mechanisms that can help riparian States address the combined uncertainties that result from the 
effects of climate change and the challenging structure of the international system.
While the uncertainties resulting from climate change could lead policymakers to inaction and 
delay in establishing water management regimes pending the availability of missing knowledge, the 
existence of uncertainties should be accepted as a given because it is unlikely that additional research 
could ever eliminate all uncertainty. Therefore, it is more prudent to develop management strategies 
that can address uncertainty in an effective manner.2 This means developing robust and adaptable 
decision-making procedures that can perform well across a wide range of possible eventualities.3 
Only through the creation of such procedures will it be possible to ensure that effective responses to 
changing circumstances can be adopted in a timely manner.4
1  Alena Drieschova, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, Canada; and Gabriel Eckstein, 
Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law, Director, International Water Law Project, Treasurer, 
International Water Resources Association, Executive Council, International Association for Water Law.
2  Berkes F. (2007). “Understanding Uncertainty and Reducing Vulnerability: Lessons from Resilience 
Thinking,” Natural Hazards, Vol. 41(2), pp. 283-295, at p. 284. See also Cutter, S.L. et al. (2003). “Social 
Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards,” Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 84(2), pp. 242-261, at p. 258; 
Drieschova, A. and Fischhendler, I. (2011). A Toolkit of Mechanisms to Reduce Uncertainty in International 
Water Treaties. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem & CLICO; and Gunderson, L. and Light, S. (2006). 
“Adaptive Management and Adaptive Governance in the Everglades Ecosystem,” Policy Science, Vol. 39, 
pp. 323-334.
3  Keller, K. et al. (2008). “Managing the Risks of Climate Thresholds: Uncertainties and Information Needs,” 
Climate Change, Vol. 91, pp. 5-10, at p. 6. See also Lempert, R.J. (2002). “A New Decision Sciences for 
Complex Systems,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, Vol. 99, pp. 7309-7313; and 
Lempert, R.J. et al. (2003). Shaping the Next One Hundred Years: New Methods for Quantitative, Long-
term Policy Analysis, pp. 33-66. Prepared for the Rand Pardee Center. RAND: Santa Monica, CA, U.S.A.
4  Yearly, S. (1996). “Nature’s Advocates: Putting Science to Work in Environmental Organizations,” in 
Irwin, A. and Wynne, B. (eds.), Misunderstanding Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science and 
Technology, pp 172-190. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. See also O’Riordan, T. (1992). “The 
Precaution Principle in Environmental Management,” A Working Paper, GEC 92-03.  Center for Social and 
Economic Research on the Global Environment.
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Although it often takes decades to negotiate international water agreements, the pace of adjustments 
necessitated by climate change can increase the demands placed on the flexibility and adaptability of 
existing agreements.5 At the same time, flexibility itself can make it easier to negotiate an agreement 
because the parties have less to fear about the constraints that the agreement might impose on their 
sovereignty.6 Once an agreement has been established, flexibility can allow the parties to deviate 
from the precise wording of the treaty while maintaining its overall spirit.7
While many of the uncertainties resulting from climate change cannot be avoided in the foreseeable 
future, it is possible to establish an internationally more benign environment that is conducive to 
cooperation and mutual burden sharing. In order to achieve those conditions, it is necessary to 
encourage trust building among riparians through measures, such as data sharing, coordinated 
research projects, technical and financial cooperation, and the development of multiple forums 
for consultations. It is also crucial to increase communication channels between riparians in order 
to ensure that similar perceptions about existing uncertainties form the basis for cooperative 
undertakings.
To establish adequate institutional mechanisms for addressing the effects of climate change on 
freshwater, there is much we can learn from past experience and research. Although the uncertainties 
resulting from climate change are a new phenomenon of quite unprecedented magnitude, the 
role of uncertainty in international cooperation, in general, has long been recognised,8 as has the 
influence of uncertainty on the design of international institutions.9 Furthermore, the existence of 
flow variability has been recognised in the water sector for more than a century. As early as 1863, 
the Netherlands and Belgium made water allocation from the Meuse River conditional on annual 
availability.10 A content analysis of signed international water treaties has, in fact, demonstrated that 
between 1900 and 2007 approximately half of all of the signed water treaties explicitly referred to flow 
variability as an issue, and that the ratio of treaties explicitly addressing flow variability has remained 
constant over that time period.11 Thus, while the effects of climate change are likely to continue being
5  McCaffrey, S.C. (2003). “The Need for Flexibility in Freshwater Treaty Regimes,” Natural Resources Forum, 
Vol. 27, pp. 156-162, at p. 157.            
6  Drieschova, and Fischhendler (2011), supra note 2, at p. 5. See also Thompson, A. (2010). “The Rational 
Choice of International Institutions: Uncertainty and Flexibility in the Climate Regime,” European Journal 
of International Relations, Vol. 16(2), pp. 269-296, at p. 272.
7  Fischhendler, I. (2004). “Legal and Institutional Adaptation to Climate uncertainty: A Study of International 
Rivers,” Water Policy, Vol. 6, pp. 281-302, at p. 21; and Koremenos, B. (2001). “Loosening the Ties that 
Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility,’’ International Organization, Vol. 55, pp. 289-325, at p. 
308. 
8  Keohane, R. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton 
Classics Edition, Preface, p. xi. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, U.S.A. See also Winham, G. 
(1977). “Negotiation as a Management Process,” World Politics, Vol. 30(1), pp. 87-114; and Zartman, W. 
and Berman, M. (1982). The Practical Negotiator. Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, U.S.A. 
9  Koremenos (2001), supra note 7, at p. 290. See also Victor, D., Raustailia, K. and Skolnikoff, E.B. (1998). The 
Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments. MIT Press: Cambridge, 
MA, U.S.A. 
10  Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, Oregon State University, College of Science, Program in 
Water Conflict Management and Transformation, available at http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/
database/DatabaseIntro.html.
11  Drieschova, A. et al. (2008). “Governance Mechanisms to Address Flow Variability in International Water 
Treaties,” Global Environmental Change, Vol. 18, pp. 285-295, at p. 291. 
5352
Transboundary Water Governance: Adaptation to Climate Change
unprecedented, there are relevant historical experiences from which we can learn how to address 
these uncertainties. Those historical experiences, as well as established theoretical arguments, form 
the basis for the recommendations established in this chapter. Those historical experiences, coupled 
with established theoretical arguments and more recent work addressing the role of uncertainty for 
environmental governance,12 form the basis for the recommendations established in this chapter.
3.2 Strategies for Responding to Climate Change and Uncertainty
Four broad-based strategies have been identified in the literature as possible approaches for 
assessing environmental uncertainties or, more specifically, climate change-related uncertainties: 
a) ignoring uncertainty; b) a complete contracts approach; c) an uncertainty minimisation strategy; 
and d) an open-ended strategy.13 Prudent planning would suggest that parties adopt multiple 
concurrent strategies when seeking to address resource related uncertainties. Such a portfolio 
approach spreads out the dangers of uncertainty by simultaneously including several management 
strategies.14 
3.2.1  Ignoring uncertainty
Parties can deliberately or unconsciously deny existing uncertainties. On the one hand, there 
are “cultures of risk denial” that can cause parties to be unaware of uncertainty.15 On the other 
hand, negotiators can purposefully deny the existence of uncertainty, potentially, in order to sell an 
agreement to domestic constituencies. For example, a treaty allocating waters by attributing fixed 
quantities to each riparian ignores the likelihood that the water flow will vary from one year to the 
next and from one season to another. Also, the non-inclusion of conflict resolution mechanisms in 
water agreements demonstrates a disregard for the possibility that conflicts about the interpretation 
or implementation of an agreement could arise. Given that existing uncertainties are likely to continue 
increasing as a result of climate change, a strategy of ignoring uncertainty is best avoided. In fact, 
a strategy of ignoring uncertainty implies that the parties will be forced to deal with the difficulties 
at a later time, once they arise. By then, however, the parties will be under considerable time and 
decision-making pressures, which can further escalate the emerging tensions.
3.2.2 Complete contracts approach 
On the other end of the spectrum, agreements may aim for a complete contracts approach focused 
on providing certainty under all possible circumstances.16 Under this strategy, agreements specify 
12  See Adger, N. and Vincent, K. (2005). “Uncertainty in Adaptive Capacity,” Geoscience, Vol. 337, pp. 399-
410; and Litfin, K. (1994). Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation. 
Columbia University Press: New York, NY, U.S.A.
13  This section draws on Drieschova, A. et al. (2011). “The Role of Uncertainties in the Design of International 
Water Treaties: An Historical Perspective,” Climatic Change, Vol. 105, pp. 387-408; and Drieschova and 
Fischhendler (2011), supra note 2.
14  Historically, research shows that international water treaties have included, on average, 2.5 out of the four 
identified strategies for addressing uncertainties. Drieschova et al. (2011), supra note 13, at p. 398.  
15  Adger, N.W. et al. (2009). “Are there Social Limits to Adaptation to Climate Change?” Climatic Change, Vol. 
93, pp. 335-354, at p. 339.
16  See Simon, H.A. (1981). The Sciences of the Artificial (MIT Press: Cambridge); and Hart, O. and Moore, J. 
(1988). “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,” Econometrica, Vol. 56(4), pp. 755-785.
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each riparian’s obligations under all potential scenarios. Thus, no room is left for any ambiguity in 
treaty interpretation or implementation.
While it might be attractive for riparians to develop a watertight agreement, the exclusive application 
of a complete contracts approach can hardly be deemed successful, as uncertainty essentially 
means that unanticipated scenarios will occur. In such cases, the rigidity of a complete contracts 
approach can become an extreme hindrance to the search for effective solutions. 
Case Study 3.1 The 1944 U.S.-Mexico Rivers Treaty
The 1944 Treaty between the United States of America (U.S.) and Mexico Relating to the Utilization of the 
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (1944 U.S.-Mexico Rivers Treaty), rigidly 
mandates precise flow volumes in major tributaries to the Rio Grande. However, it only vaguely considers 
the possibility of extended, large-scale variability in precipitation. When a significant drought hit the region 
in the late 1990’s, Mexico became unable (or was unwilling) to comply with its flow obligations due to water 
scarcity. As a result, water users on both sides of the border lodged numerous complaints and charges 
against each other, including an international lawsuit that reached the International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID). While the two nations engaged in multiple efforts to achieve a compromise 
under the treaty, a resolution was only achieved when the rains returned in 2005 and Mexico was able to 
pay off its water debt.
3.2.3 Reducing the effects of climate change uncertainty
In between these extremes are two additional strategies. In an uncertainty reduction strategy, the 
parties seek to cooperatively diminish either the effects of uncertainty or its core causes. Such 
a strategy entails, for example, an increase in shared knowledge in the form of data exchanges, 
technological cooperation, and/or hydrological modelling.17 Cooperative engineering projects that 
seek to establish man-made solutions to environmental hazards are also a part of this strategy, such 
as the constructions of dams in border areas, or jointly managed multipurpose projects.
While the success of these strategies should not be disregarded – irrigation schemes have, for 
example, guaranteed food stability for large populations – it should also be recognised that 
uncertainty can never be eliminated from such schemes. Environmental hazards, which often occur 
decades after projects are initiated, such as construction of extensive irrigation networks and large 
dams, demonstrate that environmental complexities often lead to previously unanticipated effects. 
In this sense, ecosystem approaches might prove to be more sustainable options. The consideration 
of environmental flows in water sharing agreements allows the reduction of uncertainties connected 
to ecosystem degradation. The reestablishment of natural flood plains and the destruction of man-
made embankments, as well as the re-establishment of the natural meandering of rivers (instead of 
straightened riverbeds that are beneficial for navigation, but which increase the speed of water flow) 
are alternative, environmentally friendly, and potentially less risky ways of controlling flood levels.  
17  See Courtney H. (2003). “Decision-driven Scenarios for Assessing Four Levels for Uncertainty,’’ Strategy 
Leadership, Vol. 31(1), pp. 14-22; and Van Asselt, M.B.A. and Rotmans J. (2002). ‘’Uncertainty in Integrated 
Assessment Modeling,’’ Climate Change, Vol. 54, pp. 75-105.
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3.2.4 Open-ended approach
Finally, agreements can use an open-ended strategy. Underlying this approach is an understanding that 
uncertainty is inevitable. The solution is, therefore, to leave room for change by developing inherently 
flexible management systems that are adaptable to a wide variety of possible outcomes.18 Provisions 
under this strategy lead to the establishment of a variety of different communication channels and forums 
between the parties, the institution of mutual assistance funds, or indirect mechanisms of water allocation. 
They can also include the option for a gradual construction of regimes over time through feedback loops 
where each step is a response to preceding experiences and knowledge gained from experiments.19
The open-ended strategy represents very clear advantages when seeking to address climate 
change,20 and the management of complex systems in general.21 It provides flexibility, and permits 
the parties to adapt to new natural circumstances and changing social developments.22 As it does 
not infringe on sovereignty as much as other strategies, it also has a tendency to lead to faster 
agreements between parties.23 Furthermore, an open-ended approach allows the immediate inclusion 
of new scientific findings into the process of interstate cooperation without which the parties would 
have to go through a lengthy process of re-negotiation. For example, while not a water treaty but 
rather a multilateral environmental agreement, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer (a protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer) provides the 
Parties with leeway in Article 2(9) to adjust the potential impact of substances targeted for reduced 
use or elimination, as well as limitations on their production, based on new scientific findings and 
understanding.
The strategies presented here should not be considered mutually exclusive. Quite to the contrary, 
a degree of enforceability can provide certainty to the parties of an agreement and reduce mistrust 
between them, factors that are important for obtaining full engagement and cooperation from all 
participants. In that sense, an ideal agreement would incorporate the flexibility associated with an 
open-ended approach, the enforceability of a complete contracts approach, and the resiliency of an 
uncertainty minimisation strategy.
18  Pahl-Wostl, C. and Jeffrey, P. (2007). “Adaptive Water Management: How to Cope with Uncertainty,” 
NeWater, Vol. 4, pp. 1-7.
19  Huitema, D. et al. (2009). “Adaptive Water Governance: Assessing the Institutional Prescriptions of 
Adaptive (Co) Management from a Governance Perspective and Defining a Research Agenda,’’ Ecology 
and Society, Vol. 14(1), p. 7.
20  Dowlatabadi, H. (2003). ‘’Review of: Learning to manage global environmental risks,’’ Climate Policy, Vol. 
3, pp. 315-317; and Raadgever, G.T. and Mostert, E. (2005). “Transboundary River Basin Management 
– State-of-the-art Review on Transboundary Regimes and Information Management in the Context of 
Adaptive Management,” Deliverable 1.3.1 of the NeWater project, p. 25. RBA Centre, Delft University of 
Technology.
21  Holling, C.S. (1993). “Investing in Research for Sustainability,” Ecological Applications, Vol. 3, 
pp. 552-555, at p. 554. See also Johnson, B.L. (1999). “Introduction to the Special Feature: Adaptive 
Management Scientifically Sound, Socially Challenged,” Ecology and Society, Vol. 3(1).
22  See Athias L. and Saussier S. (2008). “Contractual Flexibility or Rigidity for Public Private Partnerships? 
Theory and Evidence from Infrastructure Concession Contracts,” Working Paper Series Reflexive 
Governance in the Public Interest, Coordinated by the Centre for Philosophy of Law, Universite Catholique 
de Louvain, REFGOV-IFM-47; and Henry, C. (1974). “Investment Decisions under Uncertainty: The 
Irreversibility Effect,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 64(6), pp. 1006-1012.
23  Fischhendler, I. (2008). “Ambiguity in Transboundary Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Israeli–
Jordanian Water Agreement,’’ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 45(1), pp. 79-109, at p. 105.
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Establishing a complete and well-balanced agreement, however, can take decades; often, more 
immediate action is required. Moreover, some of the most prominent success stories of transboundary 
water cooperation have begun with very small projects that have allowed the parties to gradually 
establish trust.
Case Study 3.2 Evolution of water governance of the Rhine River 
Cooperation often evolves from many trial and error attempts, ultimately resulting in the creation of some 
of the most remarkable transboundary water cooperation schemes. For example, transboundary water 
cooperation on the Rhine began in 1886 with the establishment of the Salmon Commission, whose purpose 
was to prevent overfishing of salmon on the Rhine River.24 That cooperation was interrupted by the economic 
recession of the 1930’s and the Second World War, but resumed again in the 1950’s. Over the years, a number 
of different cooperation schemes were created by the parties, until the main riparians signed the Convention 
on the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution by Chlorides and the Convention on the Protection of the 
Rhine against Chemical Pollution, both in 1976. Neither of these conventions was particularly successful 
in achieving its targets due to technical difficulties, lack of political will, competitiveness concerns, and 
scientific uncertainty about the risks involved.25 It required an accident at Sandoz AG in Bern in 1986, 
where thousands of cubic metres of contaminated water spilled into the Rhine, for the cooperation process 
to achieve momentum.26 Soon after, an informal Rhine Action Plan was inaugurated by the parties. This 
political initiative had precise goals, but no possibilities of legal enforcement. Nevertheless, its success 
led finally to the signing of the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine in 1999, which institutionalised a 
complete and fully functioning basin-wide water regime that now serves as a model for other river basins.
3.3 Cooperative mechanisms components 
3.3.1  Scope and applicability of cooperative mechanism: the basin approach
The basin approach to the management of transboundary waters has long been recognised as 
the “fulcrum of water resource development.”27 Supporting an integrated management scheme, 
the approach is based on the understanding that “surface and groundwaters form a system, and 
constitute by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole,” and that “human intervention at 
one point in the system may have effects elsewhere within it.”28
The basin approach has been endorsed by the World Bank, the European Union (E.U.), the U.N. 
International Law Commission (ILC), and numerous non-governmental organisations (NGOs).29 
24 Drieschova and Fischhendler (2011), supra note 2, at p. 25.
25  Nollkaemper, A. (1996). “The River Rhine: From Equal Apportionment to Ecosystem Protection,” Review of 
European,Comparative, and International Environmental Law, Vol. 5(2), pp. 152-160, at p. 155; and Verweij, 
M. (1999). “A Watershed on the Rhine: Changing Approaches to International Environmental Cooperation,” 
GeoJournal, Vol. 47, pp. 453-461, at p. 456.
26  See Bernauer, T. and Moser, P. (1996). “Reducing Pollution of the River Rhine: The Influence of International 
Cooperation,’’ Journal of Environment and Development, Vol. 5(4), pp. 389-415.
27  Teclaff, L.A. (1996). “Evolution of the River Basin Concept in National and International Water Law,” Natural 
Resources Journal, Vol. 36, pp. 359-391, at p. 387.
28  International Law Commission (ILC) (1994). Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Forty-Sixth Session, [1994] 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Commission, 90, para. 4, (U.N. Doc A/49/10). See Chapter One 
for a more extensive discussion of the basin approach.
29  Eckstein, G. (2010). “Water Scarcity, Conflict, and Security in a Climate Change World: Challenges and 
Opportunities for International Law and Policy,” Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 27(3), pp. 409-
461, at p. 437.
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For example, the influential 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, 
formulated by the International Law Association (ILA), encouraged a holistic, basin-wide approach to 
water management employing “a geographical area extending over two or more States determined 
by the watershed limits of the system of waters, including surface and underground waters, flowing 
into a common terminus.”
Case Study 3.3 Contrasts in Basins
The Aral Sea tragedy is but one of many examples in which independent activity in one region of the basin 
had disastrous consequences in another part of the basin. In that debacle, under the guidance of the former 
Soviet Union, riparians on the sister rivers of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya diverted water for agricultural 
purposes beginning in the middle of the last century. By the 1980’s, inflows from the two rivers into the 
Aral Sea fell by as much as 85 percent. Since Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan became 
independent States, the coordination difficulties between the riparians have only exasperated. As a result, 
the Aral Sea – a terminal inland lake, which relies on the two rivers for its entire inflow – nearly dried out 
entirely.  By the early part of the twenty-first century, the Aral Sea had lost one-half of its surface area and 
75 percent of its volume.30 This outcome is the result of practices that ignored the synergistic and causal 
relationships of hydraulically related freshwaters.
In contrast, the management and protection of the Great Lakes on the border of Canada and the U.S. 
is now subject to a comprehensive, basin-wide scheme under both the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River 
Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement of 2005 and the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 
between the U.S. and Canada, amended in 1983, 1987, and 2012. Under these arrangements, the two 
Canadian provinces and eight U.S. states collaboratively manage their shared waters through mandatory 
province and state-level procedures for regulating withdrawals and diversions, obligations for prior notice; 
and opportunities for comments on all proposed new or increased consumptive uses by all basin provinces 
and states, and considerable monitoring and reporting requirements.  Significantly, the Sustainable Water 
Resources Agreement provides a framework for jointly managing not only the four transboundary lakes, 
but also “all streams, rivers, lakes, connecting channels and other bodies of water, including tributary 
groundwater, within the Basin.”31 As a result, it has been lauded as one of the more progressive mechanisms 
for the sustainable and collaborative whole-basin management of a transboundary basin.32 Similarly, the 
2012 amendments to the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between the U.S. and Canada reference the 
entire drainage basin and focus on the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem, which encompasses: 
“the interacting components of air, land, water and living organisms, including humans, and all of 
the streams, rivers, lakes, and other bodies of water, including groundwater, that are in the drainage 
basin of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River at the international boundary or upstream from 
the point at which this river becomes the international boundary between Canada and the United 
States.”33
30  Spoor, M. (1998). “The Aral Sea Basin Crisis: Transition and Environment in Former Soviet Central Asia,” 
Development and Change, Vol. 29(3), pp. 409-435, at pp. 416-417; and Greenberg, I. (2006). “A Vanished 
Sea Reclaims its Form in Central Asia: Aral Dam Project Surpasses Expectations,’’ International Herald 
Tribune, April 6, 2006, p. 2, available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-121444994.html (accessed 
June 6, 2013).
31  Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement (2005 Water Resources 
Agreement), signed Dec. 13, 2005, Art. 103.
32  See Hall, N. and Stuntz, B.B. (2008). “Climate Change and Great Lakes Water Resources: Avoiding Future 
Conflicts with Conservation,” Hamline Law Review, Vol. 31(3), pp. 641-677.
33  Protocol between the United States of America and Canada Amending the Agreement of November 22, 
1978, as Amended (The Great Lakes Water Quality Protocol of 2012), signed Sept. 7, 2012, Washington 
D.C., entered into force 12 February 2013, Art. 1(c).
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By following a holistic basin approach, countries of each basin are better able to respond to the 
challenges of climate change and avoid similar ecological disasters. They are able to formulate and 
coordinate both short-term and long-term strategies, and develop local, national, and basin-level 
priorities for managing shared waters. They can also develop plans for alternative scenarios that best 
prepare them for the possible consequences of climate change. Ultimately, basin countries not only 
gain the ability to pool their resources to maximize the benefits of their shared waters, they also gain 
the ability to collectively shoulder the projected burdens of climate change.
Accordingly, basin States in regions expecting prolonged and substantial droughts, such as those in 
the sub-tropics and mid-latitudes, can work together to expand opportunities for capturing what little 
rainfall does arrive. Such efforts can include rainwater harvesting as well as diverting and managing 
runoff. Basin States in these regions also can collectively explore means for producing new water, 
such as through desalination technologies, and enhancing storage potential by constructing new and 
expanding existing reservoirs. In contrast, countries sharing basins that are likely to see an increase 
in precipitation, such as those in the tropical regions and higher latitudes, can band together to 
manage the expected flood waters through diversion schemes and staggered dams designed to 
minimise the destructive effects of massive deluges.34
It is noteworthy that in both scenarios, ecosystem approaches may be appropriate cooperative 
strategies for responding to climate change challenges. For example, water scarce regions can 
explore enhancing aquifer storage, recovery opportunities, and reclaiming polluted freshwater, while 
regions expecting excessive water events can protect and expand existing wetlands capable of 
absorbing large volumes of water.35 In this context, “eco-regions” and “problemsheds” (rather than 
watersheds) have been proposed as alternative or complementary units for water management.36
It must be noted that a basin approach might be construed as an affront to sovereignty, especially 
where, inter alia: one or another nation experiences a greater geographic infringement on their territory 
due to the construction of a dam and reservoir that benefits other riparians; a riparian is prevented 
from pursuing a desired project because of its effect on the basin or other riparians; a riparian’s 
water allotment is reduced from its historic levels due to variability in precipitation or evolving needs 
elsewhere in the basin; greater benefits accrue to some but not to all nations in the basin; or one or 
another nation is expected to bear a larger share of basin management and planning costs. Such 
infractions, however, may be justified in an assessment of the equitable and reasonable utilisation of 
the basin’s transboundary freshwaters as mandated under international law.  Moreover, even where 
the consequences exceed the bounds of equity and reasonableness, these transgressions often 
can be rectified through payments made by riparians benefitting from the infringement, or through 
implementation of benefit-sharing mechanisms.
34 Teclaff (1996), supra note 27, at p. 377; and Eckstein (2010), supra note 29.
35  U.N. Environmental Programme (UNEP) (2010). The Greening of Water Law: Managing Freshwater 
Resources for People and the Environment, pp. 20-22. 
36  Omernik, J. M. and Bailey, R.G. (1997). “Distinguishing Between Watersheds and Ecoregions,” Journal 
of the American Water Resources Association, Vol. 33(5), pp. 935-949, at p. 941. See also Allan, J. A. 
(2002). “Hydro-peace in the Middle East: Why No Water Wars? A Case Study of the Jordan River Basin,” 
SAIS Review, Vol. 22(2), pp. 255-272; Omernik, J. M. (2003). “The Misuse of Hydrologic Unit Maps for 
Extrapolation, Reporting and Ecosystem Management,” Journal of the American Water Resources 
Association, Vol. 39, pp. 563-573.
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Clearly, though, the best of intentions are often thwarted by politics, international relations, or other 
complications making it difficult to have all basins riparians participate in a comprehensive basin-
wide management or cooperative effort. Examples where one or more basin riparians do not fully 
cooperate abound, including in the basins of the Mekong, Nile, Tigris, Euphrates, and Syr Darya and 
Amu Darya rivers, as well as over the shared aquifers along the Mexico-U.S. border.  
The lack of full basin participation, however, should not prevent a management or cooperative 
approach that encompasses as much of the basin as is politically and practicably possible. While 
the entire basin is the preferable scale at which to manage a transboundary freshwater body, failure 
to realise such a comprehensive approach should not negate pragmatism and achieving what is 
possible. For instance, the Mekong River Basin encompasses six nations; China and Myanmar 
have declined joining the coordinated management scheme. Although their absence hinders a 
comprehensive and fully effective approach, the other four riparians – Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, 
and Vietnam – have been able to implement relatively successful cooperative mechanisms, including 
standards for minimum flows, procedures for exchanging information, and creation of a river basin 
commission. Moreover, they have been able to engage China, and Myanmar to a lesser extent, in 
dialogue aimed at exchanging information.
3.3.2 Substantive and procedural rules 
Within agreements it is possible to distinguish between substantive rules, which establish the “material 
rights and obligations of the parties,” and procedural rules, which “provide the means through which 
substantive rules are implemented.”37 Typically, riparian States tend to focus considerably more 
attention on substantive rules, rather than on procedural rules. The substantive rules determine 
who gets how much. Within the water sector, this is one of the most hotly debated topics. However, 
an exclusive focus on the allocation of water rights can create zero-sum outcomes and adversarial 
relationships, which are not conducive for establishing trust between parties. In particular, where 
parties have not institutionalised any forms of communication and do not share the same data, an 
exclusive focus on allocating existing waters can lead to mistrust and conflict rather than resolve 
outstanding issues between the parties.
For this reason, the development of adequate procedural rules is emphasised as a first step for 
facilitating the creation of a good working environment. In cases where the parties cannot agree 
on water rights, or can only agree on general principles of water allocation, precise procedural 
mechanisms can also provide clearer guidelines and commitments for the parties. Once an adequate 
institutional framework is established, emphasis can be shifted to substantive rules relevant for 
addressing the effects of climate change in the context of transboundary water cooperation. 
In this sense, procedural rules are of particular significance for addressing the effects of climate 
change, as they can create a framework for responding to unexpected circumstances in an effective 
and structured way, which contributes to adaptive water governance. 
37  Wouters, P. et al. (2005). “Sharing Transboundary Waters—An Integrated Assessment of Equitable 
Entitlement: The Legal Assessment Model,’’ Technical Documents in Hydrology No. 74, pp. 20 and 22. 
International Hydrological Programme (IHP) of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO): Paris, France. 
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Procedural rules
i. Data sharing
Data and information generation and exchange is critical to the sound management of transboundary 
waters.38 Absent such an exchange, basin States and institutions are hampered in their effort to soundly 
manage shared waters, formulate policies, or take measures in response to climate variability. Hence, 
the generation and sharing of data is always an excellent start for transboundary water cooperation. 
The costs are comparatively low, and it tends to equal out the playing field between the parties as 
all riparians have the same information at their disposal, which helps to reduce misunderstandings 
and potential suspicions. It is with the help of data sharing that the parties can start to establish what 
equitable distribution of waters might mean. Data generation and exchanges permit harmonisation 
of perceptions, and can inaugurate the first communication channels between the parties. It allows 
the parties to establish a shared language and, in the longer term, potentially create a community of 
like-minded people who develop the commitment to address shared difficulties in a cooperative and 
technical manner.39 On the more technical side, shared information can also increase the amount of 
resources and data from which future trends of flow variability can be discerned, potentially more 
quickly and accurately than when each State undertakes the necessary data collection individually.
In the context of climate change and transboundary waters, the type of data and information that 
should be generated and exchanged includes, inter alia, the following: scientific and technical data 
related to climatic conditions in the basin; the transboundary water body itself, and the surrounding 
basin environment; geographic, cultural, and socio-economic information on the populations and 
ecosystems that depend on the watercourse; current and planned water uses; and management 
activities including regulatory actions and conservation measures.40
ii. Monitoring
Monitoring provisions are closely connected to data and information sharing, and can be implemented 
through official agreements or informal mechanisms that precede formalities. They allow parties to 
observe and scrutinize changing conditions in the basin, evaluate whether each side is fulfilling its 
commitments per the agreement, and stay aware of unexpected consequences resulting from the 
implementation of treaty provisions. In general, monitoring mechanisms permit the parties to evaluate 
whether the regime operates as it had been anticipated. The results from the monitoring provisions 
allow the parties to adjust to evolving conditions or unexpected findings in a timely manner. In this 
regard, it is important to accept unexpected results as a learning opportunity rather than to hide or 
disregard them as anomalies or failures.41
38  World Bank (1993). Water Resources Management, p. 43. World Bank: Washington D.C., U.S.A. 
39  See Adler, E. (1991). “Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations 
and their Progress,” in Adler, E. and Crawford, B. (eds.), Progress in Postwar International Relations, pp. 
43-88. Columbia University Press: New York, NY, U.S.A.; and Haas, P.M. (1992). “Introduction: Epistemic 
Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization, Vol. 46(1), pp. 1-35.
40 Eckstein (2010), supra note 29, at p. 449.
41 Huitema et al. (2009), supra note 19, at p. 2. 
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Case Study 3.4 The International Commission for the Protection of the Elbe River
The 1990 Convention on the International Commission for the Protection of the Elbe (entered into by Czech 
Republic and Germany) nicely demonstrates how monitoring provisions can be initiated. Article 2 of that 
Convention provides that: 
“the Commission shall: […] (d) propose and coordinate the implementation of joint programmes of 
measurements and investigations to demonstrate the quality of the waters, sediments and effluent 
and to describe the aquatic and coastal communities, and shall record and evaluate the findings.” 
The Commission has been successful in the implementation of joint measurement programs, which were 
also made public and thus served as an additional enforcement mechanism. The monitoring provisions have 
been instrumental in the successful reduction of the pollution of the Elbe stemming from point sources and 
wastewater treatment operations. However, they have achieved limited success in addressing non-point 
source pollution, such as runoff from agricultural activities.42
iii. Technical and financial cooperation
Technical and financial cooperation and assistance can take many different forms. They allow riparian 
States to pool resources and create, for example, multinational research teams, which permit the 
parties to harness their respective comparative advantages in research and development and, at the 
same time, establish a basis for trust. Alternatively, the parties can create a shared financial resource 
pool, which can operate as insurance or an emergency fund, to partly offset the negative effects of 
floods and droughts. The Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the 
Danube employs an insurance mechanism, albeit without establishing a resource pool. Article 17 
provides that: 
“in the interest of enhanced cooperation and to facilitate compliance with obligations of 
this Convention, in particular where a critical situation of riverine conditions should arise, 
Contracting Parties shall provide mutual assistance upon the request of other Contracting 
Parties.”
Technical and financial cooperation can have the additional advantage of enhancing State capacity 
and, hence, ensuring a higher degree of treaty compliance. These forms of cooperation also establish 
mutual gains in cooperation and are therefore a good way to start transboundary water cooperation. 
In and of themselves, they enhance the flexibility of an agreement, and establish a mechanism that 
is meant to respond adaptively to a changing resource situation.43 For example, transboundary 
water cooperation on Lake Victoria began with the establishment of a common five-year research 
program, which lead to the development of a shared fisheries database and a comprehensive water 
quality monitoring program. The Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project (LVEMP) was then 
continued in LVEMP II, which started in 2003.44
42  Dombrowsky, I. (2008). “Institutional Design and Regime Effectiveness in Transboundary River 
Management? The Elbe Water Quality Regime,” Hydrology and Earth System Sciences Discussions, Vol. 
12(1), pp. 223-238, at p. 229.
43  Hallegatte, S. (2009). “Strategies to Adapt to an Uncertain Climate Change,” Global Environmental Change, 
Vol. 19(2), pp. 240-247, at p. 240.
44  Lubovich, K. (2009). “Cooperation and Competition: Managing Transboundary Water Cooperation in the 
Lake Victoria Region,” Working Paper No. 5, p. 2. Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability: 
Falls Church, VA, U.S.A.
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iv. Prior notice and consultation
Riparians to a transboundary water body can stipulate in an agreement that they will notify and 
consult each other in case they plan to establish new water uses on their side of the border. More 
stringently, they can consent not to undertake any activity that may affect the transboundary water 
body without the prior consent of the other party. These obligations are, in fact, mandatory under 
customary international water law, and have been incorporated into the 1997 U.N. Convention on 
the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention).45 
Such requirements, however, may be insufficient in basins that suffer from high water stress and 
necessitate more structured or comprehensive mechanisms for dispute avoidance and resolution. 
Nevertheless, in most basins around the world, these measures are intended to enhance trust; they 
create stability and certainty so that riparians do not have to be concerned about unpleasant surprises 
from upstream or downstream water-related development activities. Over time, they can also be 
considered as an initial step in determining more precise but flexible water allocation mechanisms 
that respond to changing circumstances and consultations. In contrast to fixed water allocations, 
such procedures allow for a certain degree of flexibility, because they do not exclude the possibility 
of changing water use needs and priorities over time; rather, they are conducive to the search for 
cooperative solutions that meet changing water priorities.
For example, Article 12, paragraph 12, of the 1992 Treaty on the Development and Utilisation of the 
Water Resources of the Komati River Basin between the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland 
and the Government of the Republic of South Africa states that, “No party shall allow within its 
territory the construction of any water storage work in the Komati River Basin with a capacity in 
excess of 250,000 cubic metres without the prior approval of the JWC [Joint Water Commission].” 
v. Mechanisms for responding to alternative/changing scenarios
Mechanisms responding to alternative or changing scenarios enhance the flexibility of agreements, 
because they permit the parties to adapt their behaviour to varying circumstances. For example, 
adaptive management techniques permit the parties to build the experiences and knowledge 
learned from the outcomes of previous policy choices. Such built-in procedures expand the degree 
of resiliency of treaty regimes, and can reduce the negative effects of extreme weather events, 
unexpected industrial contamination, and other unforeseen events.
Managing flow variability also provides many opportunities for States to cooperate internationally, 
ranging from the establishment of international early warning systems and water flow modelling 
systems, to flood and drought risk management planning and intervention. In most cases, lower 
riparians derive more benefits from such measures, because they are more likely to suffer harm from 
floods and droughts; however, upper riparians also can benefit from compensation for their efforts. 
Internationally shared early warning systems provide more lead-time for riparians to take preparatory 
measures in order to minimise the consequences of floods and droughts. Estimates suggest that 
they have a cost-benefit ratio of 1:2.1 – 14.4 (for Europe and central Asia), 1:40 (for China), and even 
1:70 (for Mozambique).46
45  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
(hereinafter “1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention”), adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on 21 May 1997. Not yet in force. See General Assembly resolution 51/229, annex, Official Records 
of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/51/49), Art. 5.
46  Rogers, D. and Tsirkunov, V. (2011). “Costs and Benefits of Early Warning Systems,’’ Global Assessment 
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In the realm of flood and drought risk management and intervention, international cooperation can 
lead to more cost-efficient solutions, and generally provides a larger range of strategies for riparians. 
For example, the terrain of upstream riparians is usually better suited to the construction of dams 
designed to regulate flow variability, while other downstream locations might be particularly suitable 
for reforestation or as natural discharge areas. At the same time, riparians can share their expertise 
for dam construction and environmental impact assessments (EIAs). The comparative advantages 
of cooperation are nicely illustrated in the cooperation between Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Ukraine in the Tisza Basin. There, an online transboundary forecasting system has been established 
with the financial support coming mainly from Hungary, the most downstream of the riparians, 
employing a model established by Slovakia, and with data coming mainly from Ukraine.47 Once 
such a transboundary forecasting system is established, great care should be placed on preparing 
national institutions so that the obtained information can be effectively transmitted to the domestic 
level, and can result in adequate policies and preparations for variability in flows.  
Case Study 3.5 The Vuoski River between Russia and Finland
In the case of floods and droughts on the Vuoksi River, Russia and Finland agreed in 1993 to a regulation 
that permits the upstream riparian, Finland, to release or retain a larger quantity of water from its reservoirs, 
depending on available weather forecasts, in order to balance the water flow in the river. Under the 
scheme, Finland is obligated to provide Russia with daily updates on water levels and discharges. Potential 
damages are compensated upon agreement achieved through a bilateral commission. The regulation has 
been employed on numerous occasions with highly positive results and no substantial difficulties in its 
implementation. It has been estimated that Finland has prevented damages from floods and droughts 
valued at an estimated 10 million Euros, while compensating Russia with one million Euros for losses 
in hydropower.48 More recently, Mexico and the U.S. amended the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Rivers Treaty with 
Minute 319, which enhances both nations’ ability to share surpluses and water shortages on the Colorado 
River through the following: by allowing Mexico, which has a dearth of storage capacity, to store some 
of its Colorado River allotment in upstream reservoirs in the U.S.; authorising the U.S. to send less water 
downstream to Mexico in drought years; and creating a mechanism through which Mexico can adjust its 
water delivery schedule in relation to overall water availability and, thereby, offset mandated reductions.49
vi. Means for dispute resolution
International agreements should incorporate means for dispute resolution, which can include 
diplomatic negotiations between political representatives, establishment of an expert/fact-finding 
Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2011, pp. 13-14. World Bank: Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
47  United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) (2009a). “Transboundary Flood Risk 
Management: Experiences from the UNECE Region,” Workshop on Transboundary Flood Risk 
Management (Geneva, 22-23 April 2009), p. 32. See also UNECE, (2009b). “Integrated Management of 
Water and Related Ecosystems – Water and Climate Adaptation in Transboundary Basins, Including Flood 
and Drought Risk Management,” Note by the Secretariat, Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. ECE/
MP.WAT/2009/4 2 (Sept. 1, 2009). 
48  Ollila, M. (2009). “Joint Flood Risk Management: Planning and Implementation – Case Study: River Vuoksi,” 
Workshop on Transboundary Flood Risk Management, Geneva, 22-23 April 2009.
49  International Boundary and Water Commission (2012). “Interim International Cooperative Measures in 
the Colorado Basin Through 2017 and Extension of Minute 318 Cooperative Measures to Address the 
Continued Effects of the April 2010 Earthquake in the Mexicali Valley, Baja California” (Minute 319). Agreed 
20 November, 2012, Coronado, California.
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commission or conciliation, third party mediation, an arbitration tribunal, or sending the dispute to 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
In the case of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, India and Pakistan agreed in Article IX to a gradational 
dispute resolution mechanisms beginning with a review by the Permanent Indus Commission, then 
moving to an assessment by a neutral expert, followed by negotiated settlement. In the event that the 
dispute is intractable, the parties agreed to take the dispute to a court of arbitration. Recently, when 
the two riparians could not resolve the controversy over India’s Kishenganga hydroelectric project, 
they took their dispute to formal arbitration before the Permanent Court of Arbitration.  A partial 
award in the case was issued in February 2013.
Ideally, an agreement would incorporate a gradual approach towards dispute resolution, where 
the parties can start off with simple consultations and move to more compulsory mechanisms if 
disagreements persist. 
Box 3.1 Water Dispute Resolution through the International Court of Justice
In the early years of its operations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was only rarely invoked in 
transboundary waters disputes. That now appears to be changing as, in the past two decades there has 
been a significant upsurge of water disputes brought to the Court. 
One of the most prominent cases considered by the ICJ, the Gab ˇc  ikovo-Nagymaros case,50 was the 
disagreement between Slovakia and Hungary over the Gab ˇc  ikovo-Nagymaros System of Locks on the 
Danube River. In this case, the original accord did not provide for a referral of conflicts to the ICJ. Rather, the 
two countries signed a separate agreement to submit their dispute to the Court after diplomatic negotiations 
had deadlocked.51 
In contrast, in the Pulp Mills case,52 in which Argentina sued Uruguay over allegations of water pollution 
resulting from Uruguan pulp mills on the Uruguay River, the parties had explicitly anticipated resolving 
disputes before the ICJ. Article 60 of the Statute of the Uruguay River specifically provides for ICJ jurisdiction 
in the event of a disagreement “concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty and the Statute.”
Using a different approach, in the three cases that Costa Rica and Nicaragua have brought to the ICJ,53 
the countries followed the prescribed dispute settlement process detailed in the 1948 American Treaty 
on Pacific Settlements, known as the “Pact of Bogota,” which both had previously ratified. The approach 
detailed in the Pact is a gradational process that begins with negotiation, followed by mediation by a party to 
the Pact or individual that is uninvolved in the dispute, a Commission of Investigation and Conciliation under 
the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), and then compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. The 
Pact, however, does not bind the parties to this precise order, and also permits them to seek arbitration, as 
they deem appropriate.
50 Gab ˆc  íkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7.
51  Fitzmaurice, M. (1998). “The Gab ˆc íkovo-Nagymnaros Case: The Law of Treaties,” Leiden Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 11(2), pp. 321-344, at p. 325; and Nakamichi, M. (1998). “Note: The International 
Court of Justice Decision Regarding the Gab ˆc íkovo-Nagymaros Project,” Fordham Environmental Law 
Journal, Vol. 9, pp. 337-372, at pp. 346-347.
52 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 14.
53  These cases include: Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 213; Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Cost 
Rica v. Nicaragua), Application Instituting Proceedings filed in the Registry of the Court on 18 November 
2010; and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), 
Application Instituting Proceedings filed in the Registry of the Court on 22 December 2011, joined with 
Costa Rica v. Nicaragua on 17 April 2013.
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vii. Amendment mechanism
A number of different amendment mechanisms can make international agreements inherently more 
adaptable to changing circumstances. The parties, for example, can decide periodically whether 
treaty amendments are necessary, or they can stipulate that amendments will be made whenever 
new scientific knowledge emerges or water flow alters substantially. For example, Article 25 of the 
1944 U.S.-Mexico Rivers Treaty authorises the International Boundary and Water Commission (U.S.-
Mexico Commission) to supplement the treaty through an amendment-like mechanism referred to as 
“Minutes”.54 This is a very innovative and highly flexible mechanism that offers considerable potential 
for addressing climate change related uncertainties. Similarly, while the multilateral Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer does not focus on transboundary waters, it is instructive 
in that it establishes regular meetings between the parties where they can exchange new information 
about research and development, and can decide whether to adjust how substances are controlled 
under the treaty.
Substantive rules 
Water allocations and rights are the most hotly debated topics in international water cooperation. 
While much attention is focused on the precise water quantities each riparian may be entitled to, 
establishing the appropriate mechanisms for water allocation may alleviate some of the difficulties 
that can arise.
i. Fixed allocations
Allocating fixed water quantities can give the parties the illusion of certainty that they will obtain 
a guaranteed quantity of water. This can potentially make negotiations easier and the public can 
be more easily convinced of successful negotiations. However, flow variability will inevitably occur, 
which could make it difficult – and potentially impossible – for an upper riparian to provide the 
promised quantity of water to a lower riparian. Moreover, there is the possibility that the burdens of 
droughts or floods will not be shared equitably.55 
Case Study 3.6 The Syr Darya Basin
In an agreement between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan on the Syr Darya basin, the upper 
riparian, Kyrgyzstan, was obliged to balance the mismatch between water flows and water needs with 
the help of the Toktogul Reservoir, and to provide fixed water quantities to the other two basin riparians 
in exchange for gas and coal payments. Also, because the energy payments of the other riparians were 
unreliable, the situation put so much strain on Kyrgyzstan in terms of maintenance costs and a loss of 
hydropower that it decided to pass the Law on the Interstate Use of Water Objects, Water Resources and 
Water Management Installations in June 2001, stipulating that water is a national resource that can only be 
sold to other countries at a price and that the other riparian States have to contribute to the maintenance of  
 0
54  The Minute process is an innovative process used to respond to changing circumstances and needs of 
the two countries. Where the Commissioners of the Mexican and U.S. sections both agree on a particular 
project, approach, or other supplementary process, the Minute containing the decision becomes binding 
on both nations if neither government submits its disapproval within thirty days following execution of the 
Minute. For further information see Chapter Two of this publication. 
55  Wolf, A.T. (2000). “Indigenous Approaches to Water Conflict Resolution and Implications for International 
Waters,” International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice, Vol. 5(2). 
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the Toktogul reservoir. The new law did not ease the strains with Uzbekistan, which had allegedly already 
conducted a number of military manoeuvres in proximity to the Toktogul Reservoir in 1997 and 2000.56 In 
the meantime, the parties have agreed to share some of the costs associated with the maintenance and 
operation of Kyrgyz water installations. While the situation remains tense, the parties have managed so far 
to avoid open conflict through negotiations and the pursuit of unilateral solutions.
ii. Fixed allocations with flexibility provisions
Fixed allocations, on their own, can make it difficult for upper riparians to fulfil their flow requirements, 
as well as meet their own water needs, where precipitation and natural recharge sources are 
unreliable. In some cases, fixed allocation schemes can be coupled with mechanisms that allow for 
greater flexibility in the implementation or interpretation of allocations and obligations. For example, 
fixed quantity allocations can be combined with percentages of flows to provide more efficient and 
flexible allocation mechanisms. 
Alternatively, parties to an agreement can combine methods of fixed or, preferably, percentage 
allocations of flows together with particular principles of water allocation, such as equity, rational 
use, limitations on harm, and sustainability.  Such principles can provide guidelines for allocating 
water while maintaining the spirit of an agreement. In cases of disputes, these principles also provide 
general guidelines that tribunals can employ in their adjudication. 
Case Study 3.7 The Niagara River Water Diversion Treaty between Canada and the U.S.
The 1949 Niagara River Water Diversion Treaty between Canada and the U.S. is an example of a regime that 
employs fixed quantity allocations in combination with percentages of flows. It established a compromise 
solution between hydropower obligations and the needs of the tourism industry to maintain the scenic 
beauty of the Niagara Falls. During the summer months, a minimum of 100,000 cubic feet per second is 
made available in the river between the hours of 8 AM and 10 PM. During other months, up to 50 percent 
of the water can be withdrawn for hydropower production, which has to be divided equally between the 
two nations. These stipulations take into account the possibility of flow variability, and represent a valuable 
model to follow when, for example, considering environmental flows in water allocation. The treaty also 
established certain provisions for the variability of demand. It states in Article 8 that: 
“until such time as there are facilities in the territory of one party to use its full share of the diversions 
of water for power purposes agreed upon in this Treaty, the other party may use the portion of that 
share for the use of which facilities are not available.”57
Fixed allocations can also integrate inter-annual flow variability by allowing upper riparians to make 
up for deficient water deliveries in one period in a subsequent period. Such mechanisms, however, 
may make it difficult for upper riparians to consistently fulfil their flow requirements, as well as 
meet their own water needs. The situation could be frustrated even further if, as a result of climate 
change, new long-term flow patterns emerge. Thus, for example, between 1994 and 2005, Mexico 
56  Heltzer, G.E. (2003). “Stalemate in the Aral Sea Basin: Will Kyrgyzstan’s New Water Law Bring the 
Downstream Nations Back to the Multilateral Bargaining Table?” Georgetown International Environmental 
Law Review, Vol. 15(2), pp. 291-321, at p. 309; International Crisis Group (2002). “Central Asia: Water and 
Conflict. ICG Asia Report N°34,” Osh/Brussels, 30 May 2002, p. 12; and Muzalevsky, R. (2010). “The Rogun 
Controversy: Decoding Central Asia’s Water Puzzles,” The Central Asia – Caucasus Institute Analyst, 
March 3, 2010, available at http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5276 (accessed June 5, 2013).
57 Drieschova and Fischhendler (2011), supra note 2, at p. 14.
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accumulated a water debt of 1.5 million acre-feet (489 billion gallons) in the Rio Grande Basin, which 
it was obligated to repay to the U.S. under the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Rivers Treaty via flows in the Rio 
Conchos, a tributary to the Rio Grande. While the debt, the result of a prolonged regional drought, 
was eventually repaid after heavy rainfalls replenished Mexico’s reservoirs, concerns remain high 
that expected climate change impacts on precipitation will cause and exacerbate future shortfalls, 
and reignite bilateral tensions.58
iii. Prioritisation of water uses
Another allocation mechanism that would be adaptable to changing circumstances is distribution 
based upon a prioritisation of uses where, for example, all household needs are met first followed by 
those of the environment, subsistence farmers, agriculture, hydropower, and industry. This allocation 
method is not only adaptable to the available water flows, but also to changing water demands. The 
method can be applied as a first approach to an agreement until a more concrete distribution of water 
supplies can be established.
Prioritisation of water uses can be found in numerous agreements. For example, the 2002 Water 
Charter of the Senegal River, entered into by Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal, states in Article 2 that its 
goal is “to fix the principles and the methods of the distribution of water of the Senegal River among 
the various sectors of use.” The Charter further safeguards water for vital human needs. Similarly, 
Article 5 of the 1990 Agreement between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of Niger 
concerning the Equitable Sharing in the Development, Conservation and Use of their Common Water 
Resources provides that, “in determining the equitable share to which each contracting party is 
entitled pursuant to Article 2, the following factors shall be taken into account,” including, inter alia, 
“the dependence of local populations on the waters in question for their own livelihood and welfare.”
Prioritisation of water use can also be found in global scale instruments. For example, while the 1997 
U.N. Watercourses Convention stipulates in Article 10 that absent local agreements or customs, 
water use should not be prioritised, the article further provides that “vital human needs” deserve 
special consideration. Moreover, the U.N.’s Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) declared in General Comment No. 15, in November 2002, that a human right to water can 
be inferred from Articles 11 and 12 of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), thereby prioritising human water needs. Similarly, the 1989 U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child contains a right to clean drinking water in Article 24. Thus, it appears that water 
needs for human health and survival are globally considered as the most prioritised form of water 
usage.
The prioritisation of water uses for human needs can lead to very specific water allocations between 
parties because of the availability of relatively good estimates of populations living in catchment 
areas. Similarly, estimates of land in agricultural usage are usually known, and water planners 
regularly work with estimates of industrial water needs. It would therefore not be too difficult to 
establish a border or region-specific formula establishing the different water usages multiplied by 
58  Brezosky, L. (2012). “Tempers Boil over Border Water Battle,” MySanAntonio.com, About the Express-
News, April 14, 2012, available at http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/article/Tempers-boil-over-border-
water-battle-3482548.php (accessed June 4, 2013); and Hawkes, L. (2012). “Water War with Mexico looms 
in Southwest,” Western Farm Press, April 13, 2012, available at http://westernfarmpress.com/government/
water-war-mexico-looms-southwest (accessed June 5, 2013).
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their respective water needs. The formula could then provide a basis for calculating the water rights 
for the respective riparians on an annual basis.
3.4  Developing Governance Structures to Implement Cooperative 
Mechanisms 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, governance is the process by which decisions are made and action 
taken through the application of responsibility, participation, information availability, transparency, 
custom, and rule of law. It is the art of coordinating decision-making between and among different 
jurisdictional levels, and potentially also non-state actors such as multinational corporations, 
international organisations, and NGOs. Accordingly, governance structures, as differentiated from 
government structures, constitute the processes and systems that facilitate the governance process. 
In the context of transboundary waters, governance structures can be developed for various 
purposes including managing and allocating shared waters, coordinating water-related development 
and conservation activities, protecting aquatic environments for human and environmental health, 
and for developing collaborative responses to expected and unexpected climatic changes. Such 
mechanisms can be pursued through a formal organisation developed for specific purposes related 
to the management of frontier waters, or developed programmatically through offices or departments 
of two or more riparian governments whose representatives meet periodically or as the need arises. 
While the latter may suffice where activities are less likely to result in disputes (i.e., data sharing), 
or where cross-border relations or other complication frustrate full cooperation, institutionalising 
transboundary water management within a dedicated binational (or multilateral, where the basin 
encompasses more than two riparians) entity can be an effective means for implementing cooperative 
mechanisms.
Examples of existing cooperation over transboundary freshwater can take various forms and can be 
developed under various governance platforms. For example, existing structures that might serve as 
a basis for such cooperation include the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), the 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention, and the UNECE Convention on the Protection 
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, and regional agreements such as 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses, 
and the Framework Agreement on the Environment of the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR). 
Case Study 3.8  Regional Approaches adopted by the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) on adaptation
SAARC, an intergovernmental regional economic organisation, has adopted environment as an area of 
regional cooperation. Under this rubric, in 1987 SAARC conducted a Regional Study on the Causes and 
Consequences of Natural Disasters and the Protection and Preservation of the Environment. Subsequently, 
in 1992 SAARC conducted another study on Greenhouse Effects and its Impact on the Region. While 
both studies lacked focus on adaptation, they resulted in the establishment of a technical committee 
on environment, which has served as a forum for raising awareness among governmental agencies and 
NGOs on climate change issues. After the Tsunami of December 2004, and an earthquake that occurred 
in December 2005, both of which caused devastating physical and human losses, SAARC countries have 
accelerated their focus on regional cooperation in the areas of environment, climate change, and natural 
disasters. 0
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Institutionally, all SAARC countries are States Parties to the UNFCCC. Furthermore, SAARC has established 
regional centres in fields related to environment, coastal zone management, meteorology, disaster 
management, and forestry. SAARC has also adopted several non-binding instruments on the environment. 
However, inadequate capacity at local, national and regional levels has prevented effective implementation 
of these instruments.
In 2008, SAARC adopted an Action Plan on Climate Change. It calls for measures in the areas of inter alia, 
adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer, and management of impacts and risks. Specifically, it calls for 
capacity building in the exchange of meteorological data, exchange of information on disaster preparedness 
for extreme events and climate change impacts. Subsequently, in 2010 the SAARC countries adopted 
the Thimphu Statement on Climate Change,59 which calls on the SAARC Disaster Management Center to 
study and analyse the current framework on disaster risk reduction, and make recommendations for further 
institutional development, collaboration, and resource allocation and planning for disaster prevention, 
preparedness, and management. 
By coordinating and collaborating together via a single binational (or multinational) entity, riparian 
States can establish trust and a collegial environment in which technical expertise can overrule 
potential political mistrust. Coordination can also allow the parties to collectively shoulder the financial 
and resource burdens of research and data generation, implementation of joint hydro projects, 
pursuit of preventative measures and responses, and other basin-related efforts. Moreover, such an 
approach can enhance riparians’ collective expertise in basin characteristics and management, and 
aid in developing a cadre of managers and experts who have a unique knowledge of the particular 
basin. In so doing, nations that coordinate and collaborate via a single entity can also collectively 
enhance their ability to respond to changing climatic conditions, such as extreme droughts and flood 
events, in a more dexterous and effective manner.60
While there is no ideal model for a formal institutional mechanism, there are a number of factors 
that are relevant for maximizing the usefulness and operations of such an entity: 1) the extent and 
scope of authority assigned to the institution; 2) the degree of flexibility afforded the institution in its 
operation, planning, and project implementation; 3) stakeholder participation; and 4) the financial and 
other support provided to the institution by the riparian governments.
3.4.1 Institutional structure and authority
Nations are typically reluctant to diminish their sovereignty by delegating decision-making authority to 
a supranational entity. For example, the U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources provides that every nation enjoys complete sovereignty over all natural 
resources found within its jurisdiction.61 However, there is much to be said about the nature of water 
that characterises the substance as different from other natural resources, and that diminishes the 
right of States to take an absolutist position. Instead of the notions of absolute territorial sovereignty 
and absolute territorial integrity, the doctrines of limited territorial sovereignty and of equitable and 
reasonable utilisation have now emerged as cornerstones of modern transboundary water relations.
59  South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (2010). Thimphu Statement on Climate 
Change, Sixteenth SAARC Summit, Thimphu, Bhutan. 28-29 April 2010, (SAARC/SUMMIT.16/15).
60  See Jaspers, F. (2003). “Institutional Arrangements for Integrated Water Basin Management,” Water Policy, 
Vol. 5(1), pp. 77-90.
61  See General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources,” Seventeenth Session, New York, U.S.A.
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Moving along this continuum from no or little authority and strict State sovereign control, to 
significant institutional authority and diminished State sovereign rights, Lautze et al., have developed 
a nomenclature to distinguish between three basic types of institutional mechanisms: 1) councils; 
2) commissions; and 3) authorities.62 While these terms are not used universally, this nomenclature 
provides useful guidance by which to interpret and assess the structure and degree of authority that 
is imbued in any particular institutional mechanism.
Councils
Councils usually consist of representatives from the two parties (usually between one and nine) 
who meet at periodical intervals to discuss issues of concern. They have a purely advisory function 
towards their governments and no decision-making authority.
Commissions
Commissions typically consist of two to three bodies.  Often, they include a Secretariat that functions 
as an administrative support and creates an organisation with a “corporate identity”, rather than 
merely an institutional platform, and a second body composed of commissioners who represent the 
individual countries. Occasionally, they also include a technical committee that provides background 
studies and technical expertise. The main functions of a commission consist of monitoring, 
coordination, harmonisation, policy setting, and the facilitation of planning. Like councils, they usually 
have a consultative and advisory function and no decision-making authority.
Authorities
Authorities are of two types. Usually they are either applied to concrete water development projects 
(such as in the Lesotho Highlands water project), in which case they take the character of a public 
company; or they function as basin authorities (such as the Senegal River Basin Development 
Authority, known by its French acronym OMVS, which stands for l’Organisation pour la Mise en 
Valeure du Fleuve Sénégal). The OMVS has full legal personality and supranational character that 
allows it to plan, construct, operate, and maintain jointly owned water projects, even if located fully 
within one of the Member States. It also has authority to develop strategy for the entire basin, and to 
periodically reallocate the river’s water based on changes in flow and availability, and the changing 
needs of its Member States. 
Authorities tied to concrete projects consist of a chief executive officer, a board of directors, and 
regular staff. The general basin authorities are usually composed of four organs: a Secretariat and a 
technical committee, which both operate along the same lines as in commissions; a political council 
usually consisting of the responsible ministers of the individual States; and lastly the Heads of States. 
The direct involvement of the Heads of States signifies a higher degree of empowerment for these 
types of institutional mechanisms, which can even permit them to develop projects that have not 
directly been agreed upon in treaties. 
62  Lautze, J. et al. (2013) “International River Basin Organizations: Variations, Options and Insights,” Water 
International, Vol. 38(1), pp. 30-42, at p. 31.
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The main objectives of authorities “include the ability to make planning decisions, set regulations and 
undertake development activities.”63 Whereas for commissions, final decisions on implementation 
are undertaken at meetings of national representatives, authorities can have a decision-making 
mandate that allows decisions adopted by the members of the joint entity to automatically become 
binding on the respective governments at the national level. In this case, the States do effectively 
concede part of their sovereignty to the extent of the jurisdiction of the authority, which can be limited 
to one issue area such as water quality, to a specific geographic region such as boundary waters, 
or to other criteria. 
Case Study 3.9 The Franco-Swiss Genevese Aquifer 
One of the only institutional mechanisms for a transboundary aquifer is the Genevese Aquifer Management 
Commission established under the Convention on the Protection, Utilization, Recharge and Monitoring of 
the Franco-Swiss Genevese Aquifer. Originally created in 1977, the Convention and its Commission were 
reauthorised in 2008 for a second thirty-year period. Among other functions, the Commission is responsible 
for developing a yearly aquifer utilisation program, drafting proposals for measures to protect the aquifer, 
remedying problems of pollution, appointing advisory technicians, and overseeing the construction 
of waterworks and equipment. While the Commission functions entirely in a consultative manner, it has 
developed a long-standing reputation for efficiency and integrity.64
Ideally, an institutional mechanism would be a joint riparian effort with jurisdiction over the entire 
hydrographic basin – all hydraulically-related freshwater in the basin – and the mandate to engage 
all basin riparians in on-going dialogue, produce and exchange relevant data and information, and 
coordinate activities designed to prevent and mitigate the impacts of climate change. Moreover, it 
also should be entrusted with assessing and identifying the most effective preventative and mitigatory 
measures, crafting appropriate steps that each basin State would take to implement such measures, 
and the authority to resolve disputes as they arise.65
It must be said, however, that it is often difficult to establish such an ideal institution with a single 
agreement. History has shown that riparians tend to develop such mechanisms gradually as trust 
increases, financial resources become more available, and the positive results of cooperation 
encourage the riparians to expand their collaborative efforts into additional areas that deepen existing 
relationships. Thus, the ideal requirements for an institutional mechanism should not be an obstacle 
for riparian States to begin cooperating at even the most basic, politically achievable, and socially 
feasible level. By developing a relationship, however meagre, the riparians can begin to cultivate 
the trust necessary to eventually achieve a more ideal and effective mechanism. Furthermore, it 
is possible to have several institutional mechanisms in a single basin. They can either operate at 
different scales, for example one at the basin level and another one at a particular project site, or they 
can operate at the same scales but in different segments of the river, or serve different functional 
purposes (e.g., one related to water quality management and another related to navigation).66
63 Ibid.
64  Convention relative a la protection, a l’utilisation, a la realimentation et au suivi de la Nappe Souterraine 
Franco-Suisse du Genevois (Convention on the Protection, Utilisation, Recharge and Monitoring of the 
Franco-Swiss Genovois Aquifer), signed 18 December 2007, entered into force 1 January 2008, available at 
http://www.unece.org.
65 Eckstein (2010), supra note 29, at pp. 445-446. 
66 Lautze et al. (2013), supra note 62, at p. 32.
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Case Study 3.10 The Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM)
The Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM) was established in 1994 by Angola, Botswana, and 
Namibia simply to coordinate the activities of the riparian States. More than ten years later, in 2005, the 
basin riparians established a permanent Secretariat for the effective functioning of the Commission. Then in 
2006, the organisational structure of the permanent OKACOM was defined. It now consists of three entities: 
1) the Commission, which is composed of three representatives from each riparian State; 2) the Secretariat, 
devised as an internal organ to coordinate information sharing and the activities of the Commission; and 
3) the Basin Forum, comprised of ten local representatives from each country, which serves to generate a 
local perspective of the socio-economic and hydro-environmental situation to inform action plans proposed 
for the basin.67
3.4.2 Institutional flexibility and agility
To meet the challenges of climate change and function efficiently, institutional mechanisms require a 
flexible mandate that allows them to adapt their operations, planning, and implementation activities 
to changing conditions. As noted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), while 
scientists are confident that global climatic changes will affect water worldwide, they are unable to 
provide precise predictions at the regional and local scales.68 For example, some climate change 
models suggest that certain transboundary watercourses, such as the Rhine, Congo, and Indus river 
basins, should expect an increase in both precipitation and temperature. While the former is likely 
to result in more flood events, the latter could intensify evapotranspiration resulting in an increase in 
the frequency of droughts.69
The resulting uncertainty in predicting whether the basin should expect floods, droughts, or other 
climatic impacts in any given season creates considerable planning complications for the basin 
States and, especially, for established institutional mechanisms. As a result, institutional mechanisms 
should not be hampered with procedures and obligations that might constrain their ability to quickly 
and adeptly respond to dynamic climatic changes.  Moreover, they must escape the paradigm 
of stationarity and develop alternative probabilistic approaches that can better respond to the 
variability of climate change and ensure that any negative impacts are minimised and managed.70 
Such approaches can incorporate flexible management systems that allow the institutions to adapt 
their mechanisms, activities, and policies in response to changes on the ground, as well as flexible 
management structures based on short command lines and task-specific working groups, which can 
operate in parallel to the existing conventional structures.
To achieve this degree of flexibility, basin States must create an environment and a transboundary 
regulatory structure that fosters the adoption and implementation of an adaptive management 
approach to the administration of transboundary waters. Explained in Chapter Two, adaptive 
management is a decision-making framework for governing water that incorporates uncertainty 
67  Brachet, C. et al. (2012). The Handbook of Integrated Water Resources Management of Rivers, Lakes, and 
Aquifers, pp. 40-41. International Network of Basin Organizations (INBO) and Global Water Partnership 
(GWP).
68  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2008). Technical Paper on Climate Change and Water, 
Doc. IPCC-XXVIII/Doc.13 (8.IV.2008) (Apr. 10, 2008), p. 32.
69  Hirabayashi, Y. et al. (2008). “Global Projections of Changing Risks of Floods and Droughts in a Changing 
Climate,” Hydrological Sciences Journal, Vol. 53, pp. 754-772, at p. 769.
70  See Milly, P.C.D. et al. (2008). “Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management?’’ Science, Vol. 319, 
pp. 573-574, at p. 573.
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into the planning process. It is a process of experimentation that, rather than testing hypotheses 
in a stilted laboratory setting, implements its trials in the real world.71 Every subsequent step in the 
implementation phase is adapted to the effects and results of previous policies. Fundamentally, 
adaptive management necessitates both feedback and updated information, both of which are 
dependent on coordinated data sharing, project monitoring, and project review processes, as 
depicted in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 Adaptive Management Learning Scheme
In the context of institutional mandates, management practices, or legal frameworks, adaptive 
management entails the acceptance and incorporation of uncertainty into project plans, policies, laws, 
and regulations through the adoption of a trial and error process. This means that any management 
or legal framework applicable to a transboundary freshwaters must incorporate language and simple 
procedures allowing for periodic changes to the objectives, rights, and obligations defined in the 
instrument. This will permit the agreement to operate dynamically in relation and in response to new 
information. Likewise, any institutional mechanism authorised to operate on or manage shared waters 
resources must have the capacity and authority to quickly respond to new data and information, and 
to alter its policies, activities, responsibilities, and objectives.72 Thus, for example, an institutional 
mechanism could be authorised to periodically reduce or increase allocations in response to 
71  Bruch, C. (2009). “Adaptive Water Management: Strengthening Laws and Institutions to Cope with 
Uncertainty,’’ in Biswas, A.K., Tortajada, C. and Izquierdo-Avino, R., (eds.), Water Management in 2020 
and Beyond, pp. 91-92 pp. 91-92. Springer: Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg. See also Bruch, C. and Troell, 
J. (2011). “Legalizing Adaptation: Water Law in a Changing Climate,’’ Water International, Vol. 36(7), 
pp. 828-845. 
72  Eckstein (2010), supra note 29, at pp. 444-446; and Bruch and Troell (2011), supra note 71, at p. 843.
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changing levels of precipitation or flow, or as the needs of riparian States change; replace or modify 
enforcement mechanisms in relation to the efficacy of existing enforcement efforts; or revise basin 
management strategies and priorities as conditions in the basin change.
Understandably, implementing an adaptive management approach in a transboundary context could 
prove difficult, not least because it would require governments and policymakers to admit to, and 
learn from, failures and mistakes in a very public process. It also could face obstacles where the costs 
associated with implementing an experimental and adaptive approach to planning may be regarded 
as overly burdensome in political and social contexts, as well as in economic terms.73 Moreover, 
adaptive management may be frustrated by a lack of accommodating domestic and transboundary 
legal regimes that allow flexibility in management decisions.74
Nonetheless, in light of the uncertainty of climate change, adaptive management may be one of 
the few viable methodologies for responding to variability and climate change.  Clearly, such an 
approach requires a flexible political perspective in which governments, policymakers, and the 
citizenry adopt a long-term time horizon that emphasises a process of learning and improving 
policies and management, rather than one concerned with ideology and political gain.75 Additionally, 
there is a strong case to be made that over the longer term, adaptive management will result in lower 
societal costs, especially given that inaction could prove disastrous.76
3.4.3 Stakeholder participation in institutional mechanisms
The significance and value of stakeholder participation is highlighted in other chapters of this 
publication as a critical component of adaptive water governance. However, it is worth briefly 
highlighting in the context of cross-border institutional mechanisms. Institutions established 
to implement cooperative transboundary water objectives cannot function effectively without 
participation from those who will be affected by the institution’s actions and decisions. Without 
public involvement, these institutions are likely to lack, inter alia: locally-specific information that 
may be unknown outside the border region; an understanding of the local values and preferences of 
those most likely to be affected by their decisions; and the ability to fully implement solutions that 
require local support and execution.77
In addition, since climate change adaptation mechanisms are predominantly implemented on a 
local scale, stakeholder participation in adaptive responses to climate variability cannot be limited to 
national institutions, even if infused with local representation. Rather, such involvement necessarily 
includes the development of local institutions, such as cross-border water user associations, 
watershed management organisations, and other related entities.78 Polycentric governance has the 
73  Arvai, J. et al. (2006). “Adaptive Management of the Global Climate Problem: Bridging the Gap Between 
Climate Research and Climate Policy,” Climatic Change, Vol. 78, pp. 217-225, at p. 220.
74  Craig, R.K. (2010). “Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State Common Law Public Trust 
Doctrines,” Vermont Law Review, Vol. 34, pp. 781-853, at p. 797.
75  Dernbach, J. (2009). “Navigating the U.S. Transition to Sustainability: Matching National Governance 
Challenges with Appropriate Legal Tools,” Tulsa Law Journal, Vol. 44, pp. 93-120, at p. 120.
76  UNECE (2009c). “Water and Adaptation to Climate Change,” U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.WAT/2009/4, (Sept. 1, 
2009), Main Messages of the Guidance on Water and Adaptation to Climate Change, Annex para. 18.
77  Eckstein, G. (2013). “Rethinking Transboundary Ground Water Resources Management: A Local Approach 
along the Mexico-U.S. Border,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Vol. 25(1).
78 Bruch and Troell (2011), supra note 71, at p. 831.
7574
Transboundary Water Governance: Adaptation to Climate Change
advantage of establishing multiple governance mechanisms, at different geographical scales that 
exist and operate in parallel.79 Such a governance approach permits the advantages peculiar to each 
geographic scale to be harnessed. While centralised, government-supported institutions have better 
coordination capacities and can manage issues at a larger scale,80 transboundary water issues are 
often of greater significance to local border communities than to the broader populations of the 
riparian nations. Moreover, local actors and decision-makers are typically better informed about 
local and regional cross-border concerns than their national counterparts.81 By empowering and 
including local stakeholders in decision-making, identified solutions are likely to be more realistic 
and effective because of the commitments and level of participation that those stakeholders will 
bring to the table.82
Case Study 3.11 The Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer between Canada and the U.S.
An example of a local institutional response to a transboundary water issue that incorporates stakeholder 
participation is the 1996 Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) over the transboundary Abbotsford-Sumas 
Aquifer entered into by the Department of Ecology of the U.S. State of Washington, and the Ministry of 
Environment, Lands and Parks of the Canadian Province of British Columbia. While the Agreement does not 
focus specifically on climate change concerns, it established mechanisms that allow the parties to respond 
to climatic variability, including procedures and mechanisms for cross-border consultation and exchange of 
information on water quantity withdrawals and allocations from the aquifer (WA-BC MoA, 1996). Moreover, 
the MoA allows for the participation of local stakeholders and industry groups in the coordination and 
management of the aquifer.83
3.4.4 Political level of implementation
The degree of interest that a national government may have in a local issue is often in direct proportion 
to the distance the issue lies physically from the capital. Moreover, management of natural resources 
that traverse a political boundary may be more effective and efficient at a political level that is more 
attuned to the geographical scope of the resource. Accordingly, responsibility for the development 
and implementation of particular institutional mechanisms should not automatically be considered 
under the purview of the national government. Rather, following the principle of subsidiarity, the 
management of transboundary freshwaters should be pursued at the lowest level of competent 
authority.84
79  Imperial, M.T. (2005). “Using Collaboration as a Governance Strategy—Lessons from Six Watershed 
Management Programs,” Administration and Society, Vol. 37(3), pp. 281-320, at p. 287. See also Karkkainen, 
B.C. (2004). “Post-sovereign Environmental Governance,” Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 4(1), 
pp. 72-96.
80  Meinzem-Dick, R. (2007). “Beyond Panaceas in Water Institutions,” Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, Vol. 104(39), pp. 15200-15205.
81 Eckstein (2013), supra note 77.
82 Bruch and Troell (2011), supra note 71, at p. 831.
83  Norman, E.S. and Melious, J.O. (2008). “Hidden Waters: The Role of Local Communities in Transboundary 
Environmental Management Across the Forty-Ninth Parallel,” in Loucky J. et al. (eds.), Transboundary 
Policy Challenges in the Pacific Border Regions of North America, pp. 195-219. University of Calgary 
Press: Calgary, Canada.
84 Eckstein (2013), supra note 77.
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A local approach is likely to be more responsive and more adaptable to changing circumstances and 
improved knowledge.85 For example, the effects of climate change along the Mexico-U.S. border 
threaten the region in ways that have yet to be fully ascertained. While studies generally forecast 
more arid conditions and reduced rainfall and stream flow throughout the border area in coming 
decades, how, where, and to what extent those changes will occur are still subject to debate and 
speculation. Moreover, the projected changes are likely to vary all along the frontier, affecting different 
segments of the border in disparate ways. While comprehensive, border-wide responses to climate 
variability may be suited for certain transboundary water bodies, sub-national bodies – who typically 
are better informed about community and regional cross-border concerns than federal bureaucrats, 
and are more likely to comply with a locally tailored accord – could be far more agile in formulating 
local responses and solutions to their unique circumstances as climatic and related changes become 
apparent.86
This “bottom-up” approach to the management of cross-border freshwaters, however, is not a broad 
panacea for every transboundary river, lake, or aquifer scenario. Factors and characteristics, such 
as the geographic scale of a particular water body, may dictate the level of administrative authority 
necessary to respond to particular issues and challenges posed. 
Case Study 3.12 The Mimbres River Watershed between Mexico and the U.S.
For example, where a basin is contained within a limited region, such as the Mimbres River watershed – 
an endorheic or terminal basin traversing the border between New Mexico in the U.S. and Chihuahua in 
Mexico – local participation and decision-making is particularly appropriate. In contrast, where the specific 
water challenge involves a basin that transects or impacts a much larger area – for example, the Rio Grande, 
with its numerous tributaries and hydraulically linked aquifers, which begins in the Rocky Mountains of the 
U.S. and eventually forms the border between the U.S. and Mexico – a strictly local arrangement may be 
less suitable or effective. Rather, decision-making ought to be handled by the lowest level of administrative 
authority with competence over the resource and its implications.87 
3.4.5 Formality of the Agreement 
Institutional mechanisms can be crafted utilising a variety of formal and informal mechanisms. It is 
noteworthy that such arrangements, especially at the local level, need not be formal agreements 
containing all of the requisite bureaucratic minutiae found in treaties.  Rather, the degree of formality 
pursued should, to some extent, be in proportion to the political level at which the mechanism 
is implemented. Thus, where the institution is intended to have a broad jurisdictional scope and 
authority that significantly impacts the parties’ sovereignty, it may be prudent to follow a more 
formalistic treaty approach. However, in certain cases, the management of transboundary waters may 
be more convenient and effective where cooperation at the sub-national level is pursued informally. 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) and other similar informal frameworks are often justified 
where the needs for simplicity, lower public profile, speed, and flexibility outweigh the customs and 
procedures required of formal accords. In other circumstances, some measure of formality may 
85  More discussion on approaches to multiple levels within the basin approach can be found in Chapters One 
and Five of this publication, particularly on the division of the basin into smaller units and how does this 
influence the most appropriate institutional architecture for adaptation responses. 
86 Eckstein (2013), supra note 77.
87 Ibid.
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adequately be achieved at the local level through a contract for goods or services that avoids the 
full rigors of formal treaties, but retains certain legal procedures and requirements of contract law.88
Case Study 3.13 Cities of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico and El Paso Texas, U.S.
In an effort to simplify their cross-border water relations, the water utilities of the sister cities of Ciudad 
Juárez in Chihuahua, Mexico and El Paso in Texas, U.S., entered into a MoA in 1999, under which the 
two entities agreed to do the following: share data, information, and technology; exchange information 
on funding sources and mechanisms; coordinate efforts to secure water supplies; improve wastewater 
treatment systems, and examine reuse opportunities; develop a joint outreach program for the efficient 
use and re-use of water on both sides of the border; and cooperate over other transboundary projects 
of common interest. In a similar vein, the Department of Ecology of the U.S. State of Washington and the 
Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks of the Canadian Province of British Columbia have cooperated 
over the transboundary Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer since 1996 under a MoA that facilitates opportunities 
for cross-border stakeholder involvement and allows for prior consultation over and opportunities for 
commenting on proposed water quantity allocation decisions with potential transboundary implications.
In contrast, the cities of Derby Line in Vermont, U.S., and Stanstead in Quebec, Canada, employed a 
contractual arrangement to create a private company owned by the two municipalities that provides potable 
water to their residents. While the source of the water is a transboundary aquifer, the wells are located in 
Stanstead, Quebec. In addition, Derby Line and Stanstead have also entered into a separate contractual 
arrangement, under which wastewater from both communities is treated on the Canadian side.89
3.4.6 Financial and other support for institutional mechanisms
An especially noteworthy aspect of an institutional mechanism that requires attention pertains to the 
financial and related support provided to the institution. Regardless of the authority granted to an 
institution, the absence of financial and other mechanisms to support and sustain the institution’s 
activities can render the institution ineffective and irrelevant. Hence, to ensure that an institutional 
mechanism can produce the expected benefits and promises, it must have the appropriate resources 
to carry out its mandate. This includes both financial and human resources, and the political capital 
necessary to carry out policies and implement projects that may be unpopular but necessary. 
Accordingly, governmental support by all of the basin riparians must be secured and assured in 
order to allow the institution to formulate and implement its responsibilities effectively.90
For financing transboundary water bodies, a number of different funding options are available. On 
the one hand, there are funding options internal to the basin. Those include contributions from the 
member States, which can stem directly from national budgets or community levies. For such direct 
forms of funding it is necessary to determine an allocation key, based on equality, in relation to the 
countries’ wealth, or on a criterion of usefulness such as the catchment area in a country’s jurisdiction, 
the population living in that catchment area, or the total water use per country. An alternative internal 
funding source may come from taxes on water and/or hydropower users and polluters. Institutional 
mechanisms, like basin organisations, can also charge fees related to the sale of their services, 
such as the provision of data, the conduct of feasibility studies and hydraulic modelling, and general 
assistance to developers. Revenue generated from these services, however, is usually only a small 
88 Ibid.
89  Forest, P. (2010). “A Century of Sharing Water Supplies between Canadian and American Borderland 
Communities,” Munk School Briefings No. 15, Program on Water Issues, Munk School of Global Affairs, 
Trinity College, University of Toronto, October 2010, p. 19.
90 Eckstein (2011), supra note 29, at p. 448.
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fraction of the costs associated with the daily operation of an institutional mechanism. Among the 
external funding options, institutional mechanisms might pursue public and private donors, as well 
as public-private partnerships. Examples of public donors who have funded projects include, but 
are not limited to, the World Bank, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the Adaptation Fund 
and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) under the UNFCC, the E.U., and national development agencies 
such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) or the Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) from Germany. When evaluating these different funding 
options, it should be considered that the sustained functioning of a shared water body is enhanced 
both: a) having a degree of financial autonomy from the member States; and b) being funded through 
regular income in the long term.91
3.5 Conclusion
Globally, 276 rivers and lakes and at least 273 aquifers traverse international political boundaries; 
with the exception of most island-nations, every country in the world is hydrologically connected 
to one or more of its neighbours. The unavoidable interdependencies created by freshwater, as 
well as the uncertainties resulting from climate change, such as increased frequency of extreme 
weather events and long-term changes in flow patterns, strongly support the need for enhancing 
transboundary cooperation as a means for avoiding possible conflict, depletion, negative economic 
consequences, and environmental damages.
Yet, of the multitude of international watercourses, more than half have no cooperative management 
framework; of the 105 international basins that employ some type of water management institution, 
fewer than 20 percent of those with more than three riparians have multilateral agreements involving 
all of the riparians.92 Furthermore, of the hundreds of transboundary aquifers identified to date, only 
the Genevese Aquifer has a formal institutional framework, while two others have a basic data sharing 
arrangement with only limited institutional structures.93 
While these figures suggest considerable opportunities for transboundary water cooperation, 
this chapter should not be interpreted as promoting a treaty or other arrangement for every 
transboundary river, lake, and aquifer basin globally. In fact, certain transboundary basins, owing to 
unique climatic, geographic, ecological, or demographic characteristics, may not need any effort to 
enhance water management. Nevertheless, experience suggests that where riparians do coordinate 
91 Brachet (2012), supra note 67, at p. 89. 
92  UNEP (2002). Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements, compiled by Wolf, A., Oregon State University; 
and McCaffrey, S.C. (1990). Sixth Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/427, reprinted in [1990] II Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n at 43, para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1990/Add.1 (Part 1).
93  See Convention relative a la protection, a l’utilisation, a la realimentation et au suivi de la Nappe 
Souterraine Franco-Suisse du Genevois, supra note 64; Establishment of a Consultation Mechanism for 
the Northwestern Sahara Aquifer System (SASS) [2002], between Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, Rome, Italy 
December 19-20, 2001 via proces verbal (Minutes), endorsed by Algeria on January 6, 2003, and the 
Programme for the Development of a Regional Strategy for the Utilisation of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer 
System (NSAS) - Terms of Reference For the Monitoring and Exchange of Groundwater Information of the 
Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System, agreed to by Chad, Egypt, Libya and Sudan, Tripoli, October 5, 2000, 
both available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/y5739e/y5739e05.htm; and Eckstein, G. and Eckstein, Y. 
(2003). “A Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary Ground Water Resources and International Law,” 
American University International Law Review, Vol. 19(2), pp. 201-258, at p. 227.
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their management activities and overcome the lack of trust and the fear of losing sovereign control, 
transboundary water cooperation can generate considerable economic, societal, and environmental 
gains in the realm of disaster prevention, water security, research and development, habitat and 
species protection, and returns on water infrastructure investments.
Toward this end, the present chapter has identified various tools for managing transboundary 
waters that can help alleviate both the general challenges of cooperating over transboundary water 
resources and the specific difficulties resulting from climate change. Among the most fundamental 
suggestions are: 
1)  A stepwise approach to cooperation that encourages trust and collaboration, the sharing and 
harmonisation of data and information, and the de velopment of realistic expectations about 
cooperation; 
2)  A focus on establishing sound, albeit flexible procedural bases for cooperation that can 
respond to supply and demand variability, before developing substantive rules and water 
allocation criteria; 
3)  Development of mechanisms that are both flexible and resilient; and 
4)  Development of a subsidiarity-based approach alongside polycentric forms of governance 
that allow local and informal initiatives alongside official interstate cooperative efforts.
